Why Ransomware Targets Backups First, and How to Stop It

Ransomware targeting backups is now standard attacker behavior, not an edge case. Before encrypting production systems, most ransomware operators actively search for and disable, delete, or encrypt backup repositories first, because a working backup is the one thing that lets a victim refuse to pay.

Why Attackers Go After Backups First

A backup is the single control that neutralizes a ransomware attacker’s leverage. If a victim can restore clean data without paying, the entire extortion model collapses. Attackers have adapted accordingly: modern ransomware playbooks treat backup destruction as a required step before deploying the encryption payload, not an optional extra.

This shift explains why ransomware has evolved into double and triple extortion. Encrypting data alone stopped being reliable once organizations improved their backup discipline, so attackers added data theft (threatening to leak stolen files even if the victim restores from backup) and backup destruction (removing the restore option entirely) to restore their leverage. How ransomware actually damages an organization rarely stops at the initial encryption event; the backup layer is where a contained incident either stays contained or turns into a full operational shutdown.

How Often Backups Actually Get Hit

The scale of backup targeting is no longer a fringe statistic. A widely cited Sophos survey of nearly 3,000 organizations that suffered ransomware attacks found that 94% of them had their backups targeted during the attack, and organizations that lost their backups paid substantially higher ransoms and recovery costs than those that didn’t.

Sophos’s State of Ransomware 2026 report, published July 2026 from a survey of organizations across 17 countries, shows the flip side of that pressure: 56% of ransomware attacks succeeded in encrypting data, but recovery through backups is climbing sharply. In the United States specifically, 60% of organizations used backups to recover encrypted data in 2026, up significantly from 43% just a year earlier. That improvement is exactly why backup destruction has become such a priority for attackers: defenders are getting better at using backups to route around the ransom demand, so attackers are working harder to take that option away first.

How Attackers Actually Compromise Backups

Backup compromise is rarely a separate hack. It is usually the same intrusion that leads to encryption, just aimed at a different target once the attacker has enough access.

• Deleting shadow copies and local restore points. Commodity ransomware commonly runs built-in Windows commands to wipe Volume Shadow Copies before encrypting anything, closing the fastest, easiest recovery path first.
• Targeting backup software with the same admin credentials used elsewhere. Backup consoles are frequently managed with the same privileged accounts attackers already compromised to move through the network, so backup infrastructure often falls with a single credential reuse.
• Sitting quietly before triggering. Attackers who gain access early often wait, sometimes for weeks, to understand what backup systems exist and how to disable them cleanly before launching the encryption event, rather than triggering an attack the moment they get in. This dwell time is exactly what threat hunting for ransomware indicators is designed to catch before the destruction phase begins.
• Exploiting backup software vulnerabilities directly. Backup and recovery platforms have increasingly become their own target for exploitation, since compromising the backup server itself often grants broad access to every system it protects.

Why This Is Still a Human Risk Problem

The technical mechanics above all depend on the same starting point: initial access. Sophos’s 2026 data found malicious email (26%) and phishing (24%) are now the two leading technical root causes of ransomware attacks, ahead of exploited vulnerabilities, which dropped sharply as the top cause compared to prior years. Human error was the most common operational root cause at 40%.

Ransomware doesn’t succeed because of exotic malware; it succeeds because a person clicked, approved, or reused a credential that gave an attacker the initial foothold everything else builds from, including the eventual attack on backups. A security awareness program that reduces successful phishing and credential compromise is doing backup protection work before an attacker ever reaches the backup console.

How to Protect Backups From Being the Next Target

Backup infrastructure needs to be defended like a primary target, because that is exactly what it has become.

• Keep at least one backup copy offline or immutable. A copy an attacker with full network access still cannot reach or modify is the only backup guaranteed to survive a determined attacker, following the 3-2-1-1-0 principle: three copies, two media types, one offsite, one immutable or offline, zero errors on verified restores.
• Use separate credentials and MFA for backup administration. Backup consoles should never share an identity provider path with general IT admin accounts, so a compromised domain admin credential doesn’t automatically grant backup access too.
• Monitor for shadow copy deletion and backup-agent tampering as a high-priority detection rule, tracked through the same SOC processes that already watch for other early attack indicators, since these actions are a strong early signal that an attacker is preparing to encrypt, not just exploring.
• Test restores on a schedule, not just backups. A backup that has never been restored is unverified, and the first real test should never be during an actual incident.
• Route backup infrastructure changes through the same incident response and change-approval process as any other critical system, so an unusual configuration change to backup retention or access gets flagged rather than assumed to be routine maintenance.

A Backup Strategy Built for an Attacker Who’s Already Planning to Find It

Treating backups as a purely technical safety net misses how ransomware actually works today. Attackers assume backups exist and plan specifically to reach them, which means a backup strategy has to assume the same thing: isolate what you can, verify what you have, and close the human-driven access paths that get an attacker close enough to try.

If your organization’s incident response planning doesn’t already account for an attacker who goes after backups on the way to encryption, that gap is worth closing before it gets tested for real.

Frequently Asked Questions

Shikha Mishra

Shikha Mishra is responsible for driving the growth and adoption of TDMARC, a flagship product of Threatcop, across India, the Middle East, APAC, and the UK region. With her expertise, she helps organizations safeguard their domains so that no hacker can misuse them to send fraudulent emails, thereby protecting both their brand and reputation. She is passionate about enabling businesses to simplify the complexities of outbound email security through TDMARC’s comprehensive solution, allowing them to stay focused on what matters most to their success.

Shikha Mishra

Shikha Mishra is responsible for driving the growth and adoption of TDMARC, a flagship product of Threatcop, across India, the Middle East, APAC, and the UK region. With her expertise, she helps organizations safeguard their domains so that no hacker can misuse them to send fraudulent emails, thereby protecting both their brand and reputation. She is passionate about enabling businesses to simplify the complexities of outbound email security through TDMARC’s comprehensive solution, allowing them to stay focused on what matters most to their success.